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1. THE ROLE OF OPEN STANDARDS?
The core infrastructure of the Internet is defined by inter-
operability between code-bases: The ‘rough consensus and
running code’ of open standards at the Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force (IETF)1 and World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C).2 However, there are a number of powerful critiques
of open standards. First, there is a widespread failure of
many core standards in terms of security and privacy, and
even concerns of subversion. There is an even more substan-
tial critique that standards are simply moving too slowly in
the face of rapid innovation. However, we’ll argue that en-
gagement with open standards is the best way for privacy-
enhancing technologies to gain widespread adoption.
What are open standards? Open standards are defined by
IETF/W3C Working Groups, who provide both the formal
structure and patent agreements necessary for engagement
with many parts of industry, as well as ideally long-term
maintenance of the specified protocol. In contrast, Tor is
at present not a standard. Only if there were multiple Tor
code-bases or forks that needed to communicate would a
standard be needed. Officially, at both the W3C and IETF
there must be two interoperable implementations for any
draft specification to officially become a standard.
Open standards are defined as “open” in terms of partici-
pation, in contrast to “closed” standards bodies such as the
ITU or ISO where participation requires government status.
Also, open standards bodies also publish their standards
free of charge, encouraging anyone to implement. While
open standards are typically required by commercial actors
for anti-trust reasons, open processes also tend to be good
practice from a security perspective, as the review of mul-
tiple experts typically discovers security flaws. This is in
contrast to the rather mysterious process of standardization
at many national-level standards bodies, where the lack of
transparency can lead to subversion. The IETF has no for-
mal membership (so that one “joins” by participating on a
mailing list). The W3C has a formal membership and in-
vited expert status for the general public. Typically, aca-
demics and activists can participate, although in practice
participation is limited due to time, travel, and lack of aca-
demic incentives.
Rather than code licensing, open standards deal with patents.
A patent holder can still claim patent infringement even if an
idea is embodied in free software. W3C standards are explic-
itly licensed by W3C members under a royalty-free license.3
1http://www.ietf.org/
2http://www.w3.org/
3https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-
In contrast, the IETF “Note Well” policy simply requires
disclosure of known patents.4 The much stronger W3C pol-
icy essentially creates a kind of “patent war-chest” composed
of all W3C standards, from XML to HTML5. This patent
war-chest is then enforced by a “balance of terror” so that
any member that makes a patent claim on a W3C stan-
dard triggers their loss of royalty-free licensing for all W3C
standards. Given the historical role that patents have had
in holding back the development of cryptography, ranging
from the RSA to Schnorr to Certicom patents, open stan-
dards should be a pre-requisite for cryptographic protocols.
The last benefit of open standards is long-term gover-
nance. Typically, programs are made either by for-profit
companies that may eventually collapse or loose networks
of programmers where crucial decisions are made by a few
informal leaders. Despite all the churn of companies and
open-source projects, standards bodies like the IETF and
W3C have so far survived and preserved the Net and Web
as co-operatively governed platforms defined by open stan-
dards. So open standards are one path that those who are
unaffiliated with a corporation can use to influence the entire
infrastructure of the Net.
2. FAILURES OF STANDARDIZATION
Yet there is disenchantment with open standards from de-
velopers of privacy-enhancing technologies. In terms of gov-
ernance, there is a widespread belief that existing standards
could be subverted. The NSA clearly subverted national-
level standards such as Dual EC DBRG of NIST, and the
military-industrial complex has long been close to the IETF,
as witnessed by the scandal caused by the co-chair of the
IRTF Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) being an NSA
employee (who eventually quietly stepped down, although he
was not removed).5 As shown by the long process to stan-
dardize a replacement elliptic curve for P-256 in the CFRG,
even an open and informal process may not be considered
fast and fair by some developers.
In terms of quality, current standards with mass deploy-
ment are considered often poorly-designed, with privacy and
security ‘bolted on’ as an afterthought. Two well-known
cases are the Battery API leaking private information[2]
and TLS having widely reported security vulnerabilities[1].
Worse, standards may even spread technologies that are in-
secure and privacy-invasive: The W3C is standardizing ac-
cess to DRM in Encrypted Media Extensions against the
20040205/
4http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3979.txt
5http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03554.html
recommendations of many in the security community.6 The
IETF/W3C WebRTC reveals the IP address of its user even
if a VPN is being used: The standards process ignored the
needs of activists, like in Iran, that were using VPNs to
obscure their identity.
The open nature of standards is ultimately the best de-
fense against subversion. To a large extent these failures of
the standardization process result from a failure of partici-
pation, with errors being noticed only after deployment of
the standard. Without the right experts at the table from
the start, flaws will not be detected until after standardiza-
tion. The W3C and IETF are welcoming to more security
and privacy experts joining Working Groups. After all, the
IETF proclaimed that “pervasive monitoring is an attack”
after the Snowden revelations.7 There has been progress as
well, as new standards like TLS 1.3 and Web Authentication
are aggressively improving security. Yet privacy reviews are
still for the most part voluntary and there is a distinct lack
of awareness of data minimization.
A more fundamental critique of standards is that open
standards freeze innovation. Marlinspike argued that stan-
dardized federation like XMPP and PGP should be aban-
doned in favor of more rapid innovation.8 Rapidly pushing
out updates (for not only user experience but also protecting
metadata) seems to go against the slow process of standard-
ization. While this critique makes sense in terms of security
updates, it only makes sense for the platform as a whole
if one believes that the primary driver of innovation is the
original software development team. As shown by the rapid
proliferation of app-stores and open APIs, closed platforms
tend to open up in order to capitalize on user-driven open in-
novation. Only core functionality should be standardized in
order to enable open “permissionless” innovation to happen
both above and below the standard. Standards only “freeze”
development if extensibilty points are not well-defined and
the standards body fails to continue to upgrade the standard
in the face of innovation. Today’s growth of closed silos on
top of open standards is a testament to both sides of this
principle.
Although the use of the address-book as the“portable” so-
cial network in mobile devices is a (privacy-invasive) starting
point, it is far from the only layer that is in need of standard-
ization. Is there a way to boot-strap new applications with-
out handing the entire social graph to a third-party server?
Can users save and move media and messages from one (en-
crypted) encrypted messaging app to another? These tasks
require open standards. As the Internet is currently divided
into mutually incompatible silos whose network effects make
it difficult for start-ups like Open Whisper Systems to gain
enough users to take control of the market, open standards
are key for letting users switch applications easily and even
communicate to existing silos.
3. THE FUTURE OF STANDARDS
One should not be in despair of the current dismal state
of standards in domains like secure messaging: The slow
progress of XMPP (OTR) and SMTP (PGP) is due to at-
tempts to add security to protocols that were never built
6http://boingboing.net/2016/03/29/security-researchers-
help-eff.html
7http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7258.txt
8https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/
with security in mind. What is needed is new standards with
correct data minimization properties and security guaran-
tees from the beginning. Yet what new standards should be
pursued? Despite all the talk of innovation, there are only a
small number of tasks that compose everyday Net use: Mes-
saging, file-sharing, calendaring, and the like. Could each
of these have a new privacy-enhanced protocol? In order to
chose new candidates for standardization a number of simple
criteria should be applied to new standards efforts: 1) num-
ber of open-source codebases as well as closed-source prod-
ucts pursuing similar goals 2) number of competing proto-
cols in the space used by aforementioned projects/products
3) number of users of these protocols, with a bias to users in
at-risk areas 4) relative maturity of the protocols themselves.
A new generation of protocols could be adopted if either
privacy is ultimately valued as a fundamental right (via pop-
ular or regulatory pressure) or a “privacy market” emerges.
Already the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations
Research Group9 is investigating the connections between
privacy-enhanced protocols and the Apple vs. FBI case
has demonstrated market interest in encryption and privacy.
Concretely, there are a number of candidate protocols that
would be required for end-to-end encrypted messaging across
various platforms, including key discovery[3] and end-to-end
encrypted messaging.10 We should begin a new post-PGP
standardization effort that brings privacy to everyone, not
just the cryptographic elite.
Due to its foundation as an academic network and histori-
cal restrictions on cryptography, the Internet was built with-
out strong cryptography and privacy. As put by Vint Cerf,
“I worked with the National Security Agency on the design
of a secured version of the internet but we used classified se-
curity technology at the time and I couldn’t share that with
my colleagues. If I could start over again I would have in-
troduced a lot more strong authentication and cryptography
into the system.”11 After Snowden, the historical responsi-
bility of open standards bodies like the IETF and the W3C
is to upgrade the common infrastructure. However, they
will not be able to do so without a new generation of pri-
vacy academics and activists guiding these standardization
efforts. This historical task requires going beyond deploying
privacy-enhancing technology only in particular companies,
start-ups, or code-bases, but to recognize our responsibility
to build privacy into the open standards themselves.
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